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Abstract
Auctions have been proposed as a way to provide economic incentives for primary users to
dynamically allocate unused spectrum to other users in need of it. Previously proposed schemes do
not take into account the fact that the power constraints of users might prevent them from transmitting
their bid prices to the auctioneer with high precision and that transmitted bid prices must travel through a
noisy channel. These schemes also have very high overheads which cannot be accommodated in wireless
standards. We propose auction schemes where a central clearing authority auctions spectrum to users
who bid for it, while taking into account quantization of prices, overheads in bid revelation, and noise
in the channel explicitly. Our schemes are closely related to channel output feedback problems and,
specifically, to the technique of posterior matching. We consider several scenarios where the objective
of the clearing authority is to award spectrum to the bidders who value spectrum the most. We prove
theoretically that this objective is asymptotically attained by our scheme when the bidders are nonstrategic with constant bids. We propose separate schemes to make strategic users reveal their private
values truthfully, to auction multiple sub-channels among strategic users, and to track slowly timevarying bid prices. Our simulations illustrate the optimality of our schemes for constant bid prices, and
also demonstrate the effectiveness of our tracking algorithm for slowly time-varying bids.
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I.

I NTRODUCTION

The increasing interest in cognitive radio systems has led to the development of the IEEE
802.22 and IEEE 802.16h standards [2], [3]. These standards support some of the flexible
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and shared spectrum features of cognitive radios. Both these cognitive radio standards have
mechanisms for communication between base stations, which could enable sharing of unused
spectrum among unlicensed users who compete for it. In this setting, an economic incentive
might be necessary for spectrum owners to be willing to allocate their unused spectrum to other
users who are in need of it. As a way of providing this incentive to the spectrum owner, secondary
spectrum auctions have been proposed for dynamic spectrum allocation.
A critical issue in secondary spectrum auctions that does not exist in traditional auction
settings (such as art auctions or stock exchanges) and has not been considered in the literature
is the receive error during bid revelation. The framework we present in this paper addresses this
important problem for the first time. Another critical issue, also unique to secondary spectrum
auctions and not dealt with in the literature, is the fact that participants will have to reveal their
bids using the bits that are available for exchanging control messages. The number of such bits
available at each step would be small, fixed, and dependent on the specific wireless standard.
The present paper addresses this issue for the first time by restricting bid revelation to one bit per
user per bidding round (all our results can be easily extended to the case when more than one bit
is available). We design an auction scheme, called matched auctioning, which is asymptotically
optimal for the case of time-invariant bids, in the sense that it allocates spectrum to the highest
bidder as the number of bidding rounds increases. In practical scenarios, however, the bids could
change with time due to the time-varying nature of the wireless channel and changing bidder
preferences. This fact puts further constraint on the number of bits a participant can use to update
the auctioneer when its bid changes. If this overhead were large, then the delays would make the
auction scheme impractical for time-varying bids. Therefore the tracking of time-varying bids
is an important and difficult problem, which also has not been addressed in the literature. Our
paper is the first one to propose and evaluate an algorithm for this problem.
The first central contribution of our paper that sets it apart from the existing literature is
the articulation of these critical problems that are unique to secondary spectrum auctions and
do not arise in traditional auctions, namely, the noise in the user-to-auctioneer channels; the
limited number of bits available to each user for communicating its bids; and the importance of
time-varying bids. The explicit consideration of these communication issues is essential in the
development of practical secondary spectrum auction schemes. Our second central contribution
is a framework for addressing these problems—the first such framework in the literature.

As part of these contributions, we propose several auction schemes under a scenario where
there are two-way channels between the auctioneer (or clearing authority – abbreviated as CA)
and the users. Our schemes explicitly account for the issues outlined earlier. In such a set-up, the
time period of interest is divided into multiple rounds, where each round consists of an updateand-allocate period and a spectrum use period. During an update-and-allocate period, each user
can only transmit a small, fixed number of bits to the CA through a noisy channel. This is
because users are heavily constrained by the available power and dedicated control information
bits. The CA then chooses a winner for each spectrum unit under auction. The winners can
use the spectrum awarded to them during the next spectrum use period. After the spectrum use
period, the CA gets back control of the spectrum and begins the next round of allocations.
A natural objective of the CA is to discover the true values of the users and allocate spectrum
to users who value it the most. The main part of our proposed framework is a scheme which
enables the CA to asymptotically achieve this objective. Moreover, we prove that asymptotically,
the CA’s revenue can be made arbitrarily close to the highest bid. In addition, due to our scheme’s
small communication overhead, it can be extended to handle other practical issues like strategic
bidders, simultaneous auctioning of multiple units of spectrum, and time-varying bids. Because
our method is closely related to the technique of posterior matching [4], [5], we call it matched
auctioning. Since the CA is typically a base station that can transmit using a large amount of
power, we assume that the channel from the CA to each user is noiseless (whereas the user-toCA channels are noisy). This assumption is important because if the CA-to-user channels are
noisy, then noise would accumulate with each round. This case is a problem of active research
in communication theory that warrants further investigation.
After a literature review in Section II and the description of our basic system set-up in
Section III for single-unit multi-round auctions, we present our framework in Sections IV-VIII.
The simulation results are in Section IX. The components of our framework are as follows.
Unmatched auctioning: To study the behavior of the schemes in the existing literature under
communication constraints, in Section IV we propose a scheme to auction one unit of spectrum,
where the users do not utilize the feedback bits from the CA to decide their future transmissions.
This motivating example is suboptimal since it does not provide any allocation guarantees.
Matched auctioning: Our central scheme to auction one spectrum unit among non-strategic
users is described in Section V. We prove that this scheme is asymptotically optimal in the

sense of getting arbitrarily close to maximizing the CA’s revenue and allocating spectrum to
the highest bidder as the number of auction rounds increases. Following this, we propose three
separate extensions accounting for other practical considerations. These extensions illustrate the
importance of low communication overheads and the scalability of matched auctioning.
Quantized single-unit auctions with strategic users: In Section VI, we propose a single
unit auction scheme called truthful matched auctioning that can handle strategic users. These
are non-cooperating and rational users that attempt to maximize their payoff. Our simulation
results suggest that under truthful matched auctioning, truthful bid revelation becomes weakly
dominant as the number of update rounds increases.
Quantized Vickrey auctions: Section VII proposes a scheme to simultaneously auction
multiple units of spectrum among strategic users. Simulations of this scheme also suggest that
truthful bid revelation is a weakly dominant strategy as the number of rounds increases.
Matched auctioning with slowly time-varying bids: Constant bid prices can be a strong
assumption for wireless systems. For example, a user could be a mobile device that wants to
vary its bid due to changing channel conditions. A user may also want to increase its bid if it had
lost many previous auction rounds. Section VIII proposes a tracking method for this scenario.
Simulations show that, for a wide range of parameters that govern bid price dynamics, our
scheme’s revenue is close to optimal, outperforming matched auctioning with no bid tracking.
II.

L ITERATURE

REVIEW

There have been many secondary spectrum auction schemes in the literature that address
various issues excluding the ones we have described earlier. Spectrum auctions taking wireless
interference into account are proposed in [6], [7] and [8]. In [7] and [8], computationally
efficient suboptimal schemes have been proposed to allocate multiple channels, with the objective
of maximizing revenue. Spectrum sharing problems have been viewed from a game theoretic
perspective in [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. Auction based resource allocation has been studied
for cooperative networks in [14]. Mechanisms for dynamic spectrum sharing using spectrum
contracts among primary users have been proposed in [15] and [16].
The drawbacks of the schemes in the current literature become clear when we look at the close
connection between secondary spectrum auctions and user scheduling problems. In a scheduling
problem, a scheduler collects channel quality information (CQI) from the users that it serves.

Based on the CQI and fairness considerations, the scheduler allocates time or frequency slots to
users. But if users provide perfect, unquantized CQI using instantaneous SNR, then scheduling
algorithms would become impractical as the number of users increases [17]. This is because the
amount of power and bandwidth required for reliably communicating this information would be
enormous. Therefore, a number papers have attempted to reduce the number of bits used for
communicating CQI information in user scheduling problems. Methods to reduce communication
from users include quantizing SNR information using multiple levels [17], [18], and having each
user transmit its quantized SNR information only if its SNR exceeds a particular threshold [19].
It has been argued in [18] and [20] that increasing the number of bits from each user to the
scheduler results in diminishing improvements in throughput.
Two other challenges in user scheduling are due to latency and erroneous CQI. In [21], the
impact of latency on such schemes is analyzed, where a user could be allowed to transmit at a
time slot based on outdated CQI. As we have mentioned earlier, delay is an important factor in
secondary spectrum auction design because time-varying bids can affect performance adversely
when overheads for bid revelation are high. It is found in [21] that the performance of scheduling
algorithms degrades significantly with delay, even when the channel is slowly varying with time.
The scheduling problem under the noisy CQI scenario is studied in [22]. Literature surveys on
limited feedback in wireless communications and limited feedback adaptive transmission and
scheduling can be found in [23] and [24], respectively.
III.

S YSTEM

SET- UP AND SINGLE - UNIT AUCTION SCHEME OUTLINE

Consider the scenario of a fixed number (N) of users bidding for one unit of spectrum that is
being auctioned by a central clearing authority — abbreviated as CA. The CA is a base-station,
and the users could be wireless devices in a particular cell or even other base stations. We assume
that users have messages to send whenever they are provided the opportunity to do so.
A. Definitions and preliminaries
Secondary spectrum auctions are modeled as private value auctions, in which the ith user
attaches a value (vi ) to the object under auction. These values are only known to the respective
users. Prior to receiving any information from the users, the auctioneer models these values as
i.i.d. random variables. In spectrum auctions, this distribution models channel conditions, user

requirements, and other factors that would affect the value of one spectrum unit. The strategy
of the ith user is a mapping from its true value vi into a bid price i.e., si (vi ) = bi . In a standard
auction, the ith user will win the auction if it has the highest bid. The auctioneer then charges an
ask price equal to a, giving the winner a payoff equal to vi − a and zero payoff for the others. A
strategic user is one which behaves so as to maximize its payoff. If a user is non-strategic, then
its strategy is the identity function. A non-strategic user is also assumed to always be truthful
and to adhere to the auction rules, even if deviating from the rules would give it higher payoffs.
Throughout this work, we assume that the auctioneer is always truthful and does not deviate
from the designed auction scheme. We also assume that the CA can ascertain whether the users
are strategic or not before the auction begins.
A natural choice for the ask price that the winner gets charged is the winning bid itself. Such
an auction is called a first price auction. Bidding one’s own value in a first price auction would
only guarantee a payoff of zero. Therefore, in general first price auctions, strategic bidders will
not bid their true private values. On the other hand, for a standard auction where the ask price
is equal to the second highest bid, the strategy si (vi ) = vi is a weakly dominant strategy for
each user. This means that irrespective of what other users do, a user would not receive a better
payoff if it did not bid truthfully. This is a good property for an auction to have since each user
knows what to do irrespective of what other users do. The definitions and results introduced
here are standard in the auctions literature [25]. The next subsection outlines our single-unit
auction schemes. The set-up of the multi-unit auction scheme in Section VII is similar to the
set-up of truthful matched auctioning. We explain the set-up for quantized Vickrey auctions in
the corresponding section for ease of description and clarity in conveying the main ideas.
B. Single-unit auction scheme outline
Depending on channel conditions, individual requirements and strategies, the users fix their
bids as b1 , · · · , bN , which are all assumed to lie in the interval [0, 1]. We assume that there
is a two-way channel between each user and the CA, and there is no interference between
these channels. Since the CA is typically a base station with high transmit power and unutilized
bandwidth that is dedicated to control, we assume that the CA-to-user channels are noiseless.
The CA can award spectrum to the highest bidder of each round in one shot if the users could
send their bids to the CA with infinite precision. But in our set-up, we consider quantization and

Fig. 1. The CA has control of the spectrum during update-and-allocate period. Users only have control channels to communicate
with the CA. The CA updates its bid estimates and decides to allot spectrum to one of the users for the following spectrum use
period. Based on the updated bid estimates, the CA updates the ask price it will charge the winner. The CA gets back control
of spectrum following the spectrum use period, and this process continues as long as the CA is willing to auction spectrum.

noise constraints explicitly. This results in the CA refining its estimate of the highest bid from
round-to-round. Each round is divided into two disjoint intervals, an update-and-allocate period
and a spectrum use period, as depicted in Fig. 1. As mentioned in the introduction, there are
strong similarities between user scheduling and secondary spectrum auctions. Thus, the duration
of each round would be similar to the timescales associated with user scheduling.
During an update-and-allocate period, the users have severely constrained channels connecting
them to the CA. As a result, each of those periods is meant to refine the CA’s estimate of the
user’s bids while using very limited signaling. We now list the steps that take place in the tth
update-and-allocate period for single-unit auctions.

◦ At the start of round t, user i is allowed to send only one bit1 to the CA, denoted by xit .

In general, xit is a function of bi and all the other information available to the user until round
t. Due to noise in the user-to-CA channel, xit is received by the CA as yit .

◦ Since the CA does not know the bids, it models them as independent continuous random
variables {Bi }N
i=1 , each uniform over [0, 1].

2

◦ Using (y1t, · · · , yN t) and all the bits received during the previous rounds, the CA estimates

each bid and awards spectrum for the corresponding spectrum use period to the user whose bid
price estimate is the highest. Ties are broken arbitrarily.

◦ A spectrum ask price at is fixed by the CA based on its updated bid estimates.
◦ The CA then sends the first feedback bit uit to each user i, which is to inform the user whether

it was awarded spectrum for the following spectrum use period (uit = 1) or not (uit = 0). This
is given by uit = Iuser i won round t , where IA is the indicator function of event A.

◦ The second feedback bit sent from the CA to user i is zit = yit. This bit is sent so that all the

1
Our scheme can be extended to provide more fine grained information during each round if users are allowed to send multiple
bits. This would require the number of feedback bits from the CA to the users to be expanded to provide perfect channel output
information back to the users.
2

We use upper case letters for random variables and lower case letters for their realizations.

users can perform the same updates as the CA and compute the CA’s new bid estimate. When
users are strategic, the CA has to send a third bit, ỹit , to enable the users to compute the ask
price. Bits sent by the CA are correctly received by the users due to noiseless feedback.

◦ When users are not strategic, the winner has the option to reject spectrum and pay nothing
if the ask price is larger than its bid. If the winner exercises this option, then the CA’s revenue
during round t will be zero, and spectrum will be unused in the following spectrum use period.
If the winner chooses to accept spectrum the CA’s revenue will be equal to the ask price at . In
truthful matched auctioning, winners are not allowed to reject spectrum since they are strategic.
Therefore, they always use spectrum, giving a revenue of at to the CA during each round.

◦ Allowing winners to reject spectrum when they are not strategic is beneficial to the winners.

Although it could reduce the revenue of the CA during the initial update rounds, we prove that
the revenue converges in probability to a price close to the maximum bid price as the number of

update rounds increases. Not allowing winners to reject spectrum in truthful matched auctioning
tackles the problem of strategic bidders at the cost of winners having to sometimes pay a price
larger than their bid. But our simulations suggest that as the number of update rounds increases,
the probability of winners paying an amount smaller than their bid converges to one.

◦ Subsequent to the corresponding spectrum use period, the CA gets back control of the spectrum

and the users will send xi,t+1 , just like in the previous round. This procedure continues as long
as the CA has a unit of spectrum to auction. The steps in one update-and-allocate period for
single-unit auctions are illustrated in Fig. 2. In this section, we have left out the exact equations
that are used by each scheme to compute xit and at . These will be addressed in the corresponding
sections. We will also address the computation of ỹit in Section VI on truthful matched auctions.

◦ In practice, the final payments can be made to the CA at the end of the auction. When users

are strategic, the CA has to remember only the winner information and collect the corresponding
ask price from the winners of each round. When users are non-strategic, we additionally assume
that the winners remember their usage information and pay the CA truthfully.
While the CA-to-user channels are assumed to be noiseless, we model the user-to-CA channels
as non-interfering binary symmetric channels (BSC). If the input to a BSC is 1, then it will be
received erroneously as 0 with probability p. Similarly, an input of 0 will be received as 1 with
probability p. BSCp is used to denote a BSC with cross-over probability p.

1

2

3
3 steps within an
update-and-allocate
round

Fig. 2. Update period outline for single-unit auctions: Users (the five devices in black) send 1 bit each to the CA (the base
station in green). The bit can be a function of the user’s bid and all the other information available to the user. The actual
form of xit depends on the specific scheme. The CA updates the bid and ask price estimates. It then sends the received bit and
winner information back to the users. The third bit ỹit , highlighted in red, is only required to convey the ask price to strategic
users in truthful matched auctioning. This bit is not needed in single-unit auctions with non-strategic bidders.

IV.

Q UANTIZED

AUCTION EXAMPLE :

U NMATCHED

AUCTION

As a motivating example for quantized auctions with noisy bid revelation and as a way to
compare our schemes with schemes in the literature that assume noiseless bid revelation, we
now propose a quantized version of a single unit auction with non-strategic users. In this simple
quantized auction, user i sends one bit per update-and-allocate period without using the second
feedback bit (zit ) it has received from the CA.
The sequence of bits is obtained by converting the bid into its binary equivalent. For example, if user i’s bid is 0.76, then the binary equivalent is 0.1100001 · · · . The sequence of bits
obtained from the binary equivalent forms the sequence {xi1 , xi2 , · · · }. Therefore, the first three
transmissions from user i would be 1, 1, 0. The CA’s estimate of the bid prices at each update
round is obtained by converting the binary sequence it has received from each user until that
point into the corresponding decimal fraction. For example, if the transmitted sequence 1, 1, 0
is received with an erroneous third bit as 1, 1, 1, then the CA’s estimate of the bid after the
third reception would be 1 × 2−1 + 1 × 2−2 + 1 × 2−3 = 0.875. In any round t, the CA awards
spectrum to the user with the highest estimate and sets this estimate as the ask price for that
round. It then sends the two feedback bits uit and zit to inform the users about the result of the
tth update-and-allocate round and about the CA’s estimate of its bid price. Since user i knows
yit , the winner also knows the ask price set by the CA. Based on this information, the winner

chooses either to accept or reject spectrum for the tth spectrum use period. The winners can be
given this choice since we assume that the users are non-strategic.
When there is noise in the user-to-CA channel, this scheme would, on the average, result in
sub-optimal allocations even after many update rounds. In other words, on the average, the CA is
not guaranteed to allocate spectrum to the highest bidder, as illustrated in Section IX-A. In order
to overcome this, one approach would be to view this as an open-loop channel coding problem
and use sophisticated channel coding schemes to quantize the bids so that the CA’s estimate is
arbitrarily close to the actual bid. Although there exist techniques by which users can encode
their bids to be received by the CA with arbitrarily low error probabilities, such techniques would
require large block length open-loop codes that can cause severe overhead, resulting in the CA
taking many rounds to converge to the optimal allocation. Such open-loop schemes also do not
scale well with multi-unit auctions and with time-varying bids. We substantiate these arguments
in Section IX-E by comparing the closed-loop scheme used in this work with a state-of-the-art
open loop coding scheme.
V.

M ATCHED

AUCTION SCHEME

For single-unit auctions with non-strategic users and constant bid prices, an alternative approach to unmatched auctioning is to exploit the noiseless feedback from the CA to the users.
In this section, we devise such a scheme where the probability that the CA allocates spectrum
to the highest bidder approaches one as the number of rounds increases and the CAs revenue
converges to a price that is close to the maximum bid price.
Posterior matching and channel output feedback problems: Since this scheme is closely
related to the iterative scheme in Horstein’s paper [5], we discuss it briefly. Horstein’s scheme
is a specific case of the more general framework of posterior matching. It achieves the pointto-point capacity for a BSC with noiseless feedback. In this scheme, the transmitter represents
the sequence it wants to transmit using a message point. The receiver’s prior model for the
probability distribution of the message point is uniform over the interval [0, 1]. The transmitter
knows that this is the receiver’s prior model. Both the transmitter and the receiver maintain and
update the posterior distribution of the message point conditioned on all the bits observed at
the receiver. In each round, the transmitter tells the receiver whether or not the message point
is below the posterior median. The receiver uses this bit to update its posterior distribution

and sends the same bit back to the transmitter. The feedback bit is received at the transmitter
without error because of the noiseless feedback. Therefore, the transmitter can perform the same
posterior update as the receiver. In the next round, the transmitter sends one bit according to the
same rule as in the previous round. As the number of rounds increases, the receiver becomes
more and more confident about its estimate of the message point, and the posterior cumulative
distribution of the message point converges to a unit step at the actual message point.
In our scheme, the N bid prices act as N message points, represented as random variables
{Bi }N
i=1 . The users act as transmitters, while the CA acts as the receiver and maintains posterior
distributions for each of these bid prices. At the beginning of round t, the users inform the CA
whether their bids are below the posterior median3 Mit at the beginning of that round:4


1 if bi ≥ Mit
xit =

0 otherwise.

(1)

Each of these bits passes through a BSCp and is received by the CA as yit . Using the information
it receives from the users, the CA updates its distribution of {Bi }N
i=1 and its estimate of each

bid, which is set to be the updated posterior median Mi,t+1 . The winner for the tth round is
picked using arg maxi {Mi,t+1 }, and the ask price is set to at = maxi {Mi,t+1 } − h, where h is
a small positive number. The number h specifies how much less than the highest bid the CA
will asymptotically get in revenue. The larger it is, the better it insures that the winner does not
reject spectrum as t increases, resulting in a faster convergence of the CA’s revenue, as clarified
in the proof of Proposition 2. The CA then sends uit = Iuser i won round t and zit = yit to user i
so that all the users can perform the same update as the CA and compute the updated posterior
distribution. The winner then decides whether or not to use spectrum during the corresponding
spectrum use period, based on its bid price and the new ask price.
After the following spectrum use period, the users reply back to the CA in the same fashion
3
The median m of a continuous random variable X is defined by P{X ≤ m} = 1/2. The median m of a discrete random
variable X is defined by P{X ≤ m} ≥ 1/2 and P{X ≥ m} ≥ 1/2. To make the median unique in the discrete case, we pick
the smallest m such that it also has non-zero probability mass.
4

Our results extend easily to the case where each user is allowed to send more than one bit per round to the CA. For example,
if each user-to-CA message contains two bits, it would convey which posterior quartile the message point lies in: xit = 00 if
the bid lies in the first quartile of the posterior distribution; xit = 01 if it is in the second quartile, etc. Similarly, n bits can
be used to convey which of the 2n posterior quantiles the message point is in. The results and proofs for n-bit messages are
conceptually straightforward but notationally complicated extensions of the one-bit case, and therefore we omit them.
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Fig. 3.

Useri -to-CA step at the beginning of the tth update round and CA-to-useri step at the end of the tth update round.

t ← 1 % t denotes the current update-and-allocate round
while (CA has a unit of spectrum to auction) do
for (i = 1; i ≤ N ; i + +) do
user i executes O NE ROUND U SER(i, t)
end for
CA executes O NE ROUND CA(t)
t←t+1
end while

Fig. 4.

Overall flow of the auction procedure.

as in the previous round using (1) and the process continues as long as the CA is willing to sell
spectrum, as illustrated in Fig. 3. In all our auction schemes, the payment to the CA is settled
at the end of all update-and-allocate rounds as outlined in Section III-B.
A. Algorithm description and pseudocode
The pseudocode for the matched auction scheme is in Fig. 4, which contains calls to functions
O NE ROUND U SER and O NE ROUND CA, both of which are shown in Fig. 5. Function O NE ROUND U SER

is executed by each user i in every update-and-allocate round t, to mimic the CA’s

posterior median calculations and determine xit according to (1). Moreover, if spectrum has been
awarded to the user, this function decides whether or not to use the spectrum based on whether or
not its bid is above mit − h. Note that the posterior distribution of user i’s bid and the particular
realization of its median calculated by the CA are denoted by Fit and mit , respectively; whereas
their replicas calculated and maintained by user i are denoted respectively by Fitu and muit .
Function O NE ROUND CA is executed by the CA in every update-and-allocate round t, in
order to update the posterior distribution of each user’s bid, determine the auction winner, and
calculate the two bits to be sent back to each user. Before getting any information from the users,
the CA’s initial estimate of the ith user’s bid is the prior median of Bi , i.e., 1/2. Both functions
O NE ROUND U SER and O NE ROUND CA use the function UPDATE D ISTRIBUTION shown in Fig. 6

function O NE ROUND U SER(i, t)
if t <= 2 then
% Initialize the distribution to uniform
u
Fi,t−2
← uniform[0, 1]
else
u
retrieve previously stored Fi,t−2
end if
u
muit ← Median(Fi,t−2
)
if t > 1 then
receive bits ui,t−1 and zi,t−1 from the CA
u
Fi,t−1
←

u

UPDATE D ISTRIBUTION(Fi,t−2 , zi,t−1 )

u
store Fi,t−1
u
muit ← Median(Fi,t−1
)
if (uit = 1 & muit − h ≤ bi ) then
use spectrum
store t
store the amount muit − h to be paid
end if
end if
xit ← Ibi ≥muit
send xit to the CA
end function

Fig. 5.

function O NE ROUND CA(t)
for (i = 1; i ≤ N ; i + +) do
if t == 1 then
% Initialize the distribution to uniform
Fi,t−1 ← uniform[0, 1]
else
retrieve previously stored Fi,t−1
end if
receive yit from user i
Fit ← UPDATE D ISTRIBUTION(Fi,t−1 , yit )
store Fit
mi,t+1 ← Median(Fit )
end for
Winner ← arg maxi {mi,t+1 }
store Winner
for (i = 1; i ≤ N ; i + +) do
uit ← Ii=Winner
zit ← yit
send uit and zit to user i
end for
end function

Pseudo-code of the algorithm at both the user and CA during the tth round.

to update the posterior distribution of user i’s bid, based on the latest bit received by the CA
from user i. The update equations used by this function are given in the next subsection.
B. Posterior update step
All the bits sent by user i until the beginning of round t are received by the CA as (yi1 , · · · , yit ) =
Yi,t . We denote the posterior distribution of Bi , conditioned on Yi,t , using
Fit (b) = P{Bi ≤ b|Yi,t }.

(2)

As stated earlier, Mit = Median(Bi |Yi,t−1 ) denotes the posterior median of Bi at the beginning of
round t. Mit is a random variable since it is a function of the random vector Yi,t−1 . We denote
by mit the particular realization of Mit computed by the CA from a specific observation of
Yi,t−1 . We assume that each user-to-CA channel is a BSCp , that the channel noise is temporally
independent, and that the channel noise is independent of the bid prices.
Our model and convergence analysis in Section V-C are based on assuming that prices are

function Fit ←UPDATE D ISTRIBUTION(Fi,t−1 , yit )
Compute Fit using (3) and (4).
end function

Fig. 6.

Function to update the posterior distribution.

continuous random variables. However, our simulations in Section IX reflect a more practical
scenario where prices are discrete. We therefore derive posterior update equations that are
applicable to both the continuous and the discrete cases. Specifically, we assume that the
discretization interval for the bid prices is ∆. In the continuous case, ∆ = 0. In the discrete
case, ∆ > 0, and the bids are integer multiples of ∆, with probability 1. We define
m′it = mit − ∆.
Note that, in the continuous case, m′it = mit . In the discrete case, m′it is equal to the highest
possible bid price which is below mit .
Proposition 1. Let qit = pyit + (1 − p)(1 − yit ). The equations needed to calculate the posterior
distribution Fit from Fi,t−1 and the bit yit received from user i in round t are as follows:
Case 1: b < mit
qit Fi,t−1 (b)
.
1 − qit − (1 − 2qit )Fi,t−1 (m′it )

(3)

(1 − qit )Fi,t−1 (b) + (2qit − 1)Fi,t−1 (m′it )
.
1 − qit + (2qit − 1)Fi,t−1 (m′it )

(4)

Fit (b) =

Case 2: b ≥ mit
Fit (b) =

Proof: We provide the proof in Section XI-A. The proof is identical to the one in our earlier
paper [1] except for a minor modification in the notation.
The posterior update procedure is implemented in the function UPDATE D ISTRIBUTION (Fi,t−1 , yit )
shown in Fig. 6. Its inputs are the posterior distribution Fi,t−1 after round t − 1 and the bit yit
sent by user i to the CA at the beginning of round t. Its output is the updated posterior Fit .

C. Convergence and asymptotic optimality
Lemma 1. Under matched auctioning, the posterior median of each bid price converges to the
respective bid price in probability.
Proof: This result is based on the proof of Theorem 1 on page 3 of [26], where it is shown
that under posterior matching, the posterior distribution of the message point computed by the
receiver (in our case, the CA) converges in probability to the unit step at the actual message
point sent by the transmitter (in our case, the ith user). Using the notation from (2) for the CA’s
posterior distribution of the ith user’s bid, we have the following for any ω > 0 and δ > 0:
P{|Fit (Bi + δ) − Fit (Bi − δ) − 1| < ω} → 1,
where the probability is evaluated using the joint distribution of CA’s prior model for Bi and
the channel outputs. Using ω = 1/2, we have that for any δ > 0 there exists t0 > 0 such that
for all t > t0 ,
P{|Fit (Bi + δ) − Fit (Bi − δ) − 1| < 1/2} > 0.
Equivalently,
P{1/2 < Fit (Bi + δ) − Fit (Bi − δ) < 3/2} > 0.
This implies that for any δ > 0 there exists t0 > 0 such that for all t > t0 ,
P{Fit (Bi + δ) > 1/2 + Fit (Bi − δ)} > 0.

(5)

Since Fit is a cumulative probability distribution, both Fit (Bi +δ) and Fit (Bi −δ) must be between
0 and 1 with probability 1. Therefore, it follows from (5) that, for all t > t0 , Fit (Bi − δ) < 1/2
and Fit (Bi +δ) > 1/2 with probability 1. To see this, suppose that there is a non-zero probability
that Fit (Bi − δ) ≥ 1/2 for some value t > t0 . Then (5) would imply a non-zero probability for
Fit (Bi + δ) > 1, which is a contradiction. A similar argument shows that Fit (Bi + δ) > 1/2
with probability 1.
But the fact that Mi,t+1 is the median of Fit means that Fit (Mi,t+1 ) = 1/2. So, we get:
Fit (Bi − δ) < Fit (Mi,t+1 ) < Fit (Bi + δ),

for all t > t0 , with probability 1. This implies Bi − δ < Mi,t+1 < Bi + δ with probability 1 and
P(|Mi,t+1 − Bi | < δ) = 1,
for all t > t0 . Since such t0 exists for any δ, this shows that Mit converges to Bi in probability
as t → ∞, completing our proof of Lemma 1.
Proposition 2. For any h > 0, the probability of allocating spectrum to the highest bidder
converges to one and the CA’s revenue converges to B(N ) − h in probability, where B(N ) is the
largest of the N bids.
Proof: We showed in Lemma 1 that the posterior median Mij will eventually be within δ
of the bid price Bi with probability 1, for any δ. Suppose that, for two users i and j, we have
the following realizations of the bid prices: Bi = bi and Bj = bj , and bi > bj . Then, applying
Lemma 1 with δ = (bi − bj )/2, we see that there exists tij such that for any t > tij , the posterior
median Mit is larger than the posterior median Mjt with probability 1. Now for a particular
realization of the bid prices, let k be the index of the maximum bid price, and let
t1 = maxj:j6=k {tkj }.
(Without loss of generality, we are assuming here that only one bidder has the maximum bid.)
Then for any t > t1 , the posterior median Mkt corresponding to the maximum bid will be larger
than any other posterior median with probability 1. Therefore, for any t > t1 , spectrum will be
awarded to the highest bidder with probability 1, and the CA’s revenue will only depend on the
posterior median of the highest bidder.5
We denote the highest bid and the corresponding median after the tth update using b(N ) and
M(N ),t+1 , respectively. Recall that we set the ask price to maxi {Mi,t+1 } − h, where h > 0. From
Lemma 1 and the preceding paragraph, for any δ > 0, we have that there exists t2 > t1 such
that for all t > t2 ,
P{b(N ) − h − δ < M(N ),t+1 − h < b(N ) − h + δ} = 1.
5
It must be noted here that t1 will depend on the particular realization of the bid prices: if two largest bids are very close,
then it would take a large t1 for their respective posterior medians to get ordered correctly with probability 1. On the other
hand, in this situation, awarding spectrum to the second-highest bidder would be nearly optimal for the CA.

Case (i): If δ ≤ h, for all t > t2 ,
P{b(N ) − h − δ < Ask price at time t < b(N ) − h + δ} = 1
Since the ask price is smaller than the maximum bid, this is equivalent to
P{b(N ) − h − δ < Revenue at time t < b(N ) − h + δ} = 1.
For δ = h, let the corresponding time t2 be th .
Case (ii): If δ > h,
P{b(N ) − h − δ < Revenue at time t < b(N ) − h + δ} ≥
P{b(N ) − 2h < Revenue at time t < b(N ) }.
But if t > th , then
P{b(N ) − 2h < Revenue at time t < b(N ) } = 1.
Therefore, for this case, we can pick any t2 > th . Combining these two cases, we have that
revenue at time t converges to b(N ) − h in probability, where all the probabilities are computed
conditioned on a realization of the bids. Since this is true for any realization of the bids, we can
remove the conditioning on the bids to obtain that revenue at time t converges to B(N ) − h in
probability, where this probability is over the joint distribution of bids and channel realizations.
The last operation, where we exchange the integral with respect to the joint density of the bids
and the limit on t, is possible due to the dominated convergence theorem [27].6 Although h is
arbitrarily small, smaller values of h imply larger numbers of rounds for the CA’s revenue to
converge to B(N ) − h, i.e., the more the CA is willing to give up in revenue compared to the
highest bid, the more quickly its revenue would converge to B(N ) − h.
6

The revenue converges to b(N) − h for all bid price realizations, probability is bounded and the joint density of the bids is
also bounded and well defined. Therefore, the conditions needed to apply dominated convergence hold.

VI.

S INGLE - UNIT

AUCTIONS WITH STRATEGIC USERS :

T RUTHFUL

MATCHED AUCTION

In our exposition so far, we have assumed that users are not strategic. Strategic users act
rationally and aim to maximize their payoff. Therefore using matched auctioning for strategic
users may lead to inefficient allocations, where the user who values spectrum the most is not
allocated the resource even after many update-and-allocate rounds. In this section, we address the
issues posed by strategic bidders by extending the current matched auction set-up to a truthful
matched auction. We know from [25] that for a standard auction where the winner pays the
second highest bid, bidding truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy for strategic users who
want to maximize their payoff. Truthful matched auctioning tries to replicate a second price
sealed bid auction under the current set-up. To recollect, in the matched auction set-up, the CA
maintains posterior distributions of the bids of each user. In each round, the CA awards spectrum
to the user with the highest posterior median and sets the ask price close to the highest posterior
median, which the winner can compute.
In truthful matched auctioning, identifying the highest bidder works in the same way as in
matched auctioning. Additionally, the CA and all the users maintain an ask price distribution
(At ), whose median (at ) is taken to be the ask price for that round. The CA has to send the bits
it receives from the second highest bidder back to the users, so that they can compute the ask
price from the posterior distribution of the second highest bid price. But at the outset, the CA
does not know who the two highest bidders are. To overcome this difficulty, the CA treats the
second highest posterior median as the message point at each step. It sends one additional bit
to each user, denoted using ỹit , which is equal to 1 if the second highest posterior median is
larger than the median of the ask price distribution and 0 otherwise. To recall, this is the same
ỹit introduced in Section III-B and illustrated in Fig. 2:
ỹit = ISecond highest posterior median > Median of ask distribution

(6)

Posterior updates on the ask distribution are carried out by the CA and by all the users
as if this bit has been received from a virtual user through a BSCp in each round. So, the
virtual user sends the bit ỹit according to the position of a message point–which is equal to the
second highest posterior median at that round–and a posterior distribution–which is equal to the
distribution of the ask price. The update equations are the same as given in Proposition 1, where

we replace yit , mit , m′it , Fi,t−1 , Fit with ỹit , ait , a′it , Ai,t−1 , Ai,t , respectively. As in the case of the
bid distributions, the ask price distribution is assumed to have a uniform prior over [0, 1]. Our
simulations shown in Section IX-B suggest that in truthful matched auctioning, the revenue of
the CA tends to the second highest bid price as the number of rounds increases.
We have previously mentioned in Section III that strategic winners also pose the problem of
using spectrum and claiming to have rejected it. This could happen when the users are base
stations that do not need the help of the CA in order to communicate during the spectrum use
period. In this section, we avoid this problem by not allowing winners to reject spectrum. This
is to assume that winners are always able to pay the ask price, even if it is larger than their
private values. Although individual rationality may not be obeyed during the initial rounds, our
simulations suggest that the expected payoffs become positive only after two update rounds.
These simulations also suggest that as the number of update-and-allocate rounds increases, the
winner’s payoff converges to the true theoretical payoff.
VII.

M ULTI - UNIT

AUCTIONS WITH STRATEGIC USERS :

Q UANTIZED V ICKREY

AUCTIONS

We can extend our truthful matched auction scheme to simultaneously auction K sub-channels
if each user is allowed to send K bits per round to the CA. The usual assumption in multi-unit
auctions is that the units are all identical, and they have diminishing marginal values for every
user. A user who wants to bid for K sub-carriers would, instead of having a single value, have a
value profile given by vi = (vi1 , · · · , viK ) such that vik ≥ vi(k+1) . The components of the vector
vi specify marginal values, which means user i’s value for one unit of spectrum is vi1 . For two
units, it is vi1 + vi2 and so on. The CA assumes that the ith value profile is jointly distributed
as the order statistics of K random variables that are i.i.d. uniform over [0, 1], and all the users
know about this assumption while they mimic the CA’s computations. Even if the users generate
their bids using a different distribution, our simulation results in Sec. IX-B would still hold.
A strategy in this case is (si1 (vi1 ), · · · , siK (viK )) = (bi1 , · · · , biK ), which maps the value
vector into a bid vector. The components of the bid vector are equal to marginal bid prices. The
multi-unit analogue of a second price auction is called Vickrey auction, where the top K bids
are awarded one unit of spectrum each, and if user i is awarded ki units of spectrum, then it
is charged an amount equal to the ki highest losing bids excluding its own bids. The payoff of
the user i is therefore its value for ki units minus the ask price that it is charged. For example,

if there are four units of spectrum and four users with bid profiles (21, 15, 5, 3), (32, 18, 15,
10), (25, 23, 15, 12), and (30, 20, 10, 8), then the top four bids are 32, 30, 25, 23. So user
1 gets zero units, user 2 gets one unit, user 3 gets two units and user 4 gets one unit. In this
example, user 1 gets nothing and pays nothing. User 2 pays 21, user 3 pays 21+20 = 41, and
user 4 pays 21 as per the payment rules stated before. The payoffs of the users are respectively
equal to 0, 11, 7 and 9. It can be shown that for a Vickrey auction, the truthful strategy given
by (si1 (vi1 ), · · · , siK (viK )) = (vi1 , · · · , viK ) is weakly dominant [25].
Quantized Vickrey auctions can be implemented similarly to truthful matched auctions, but
with a few more modifications. The first difference here is that for each user, posterior updates
are carried out on each of the K marginal bids, whose prior is assumed by the CA to be the
order statistics of K independent and uniform random variables over [0, 1]. Secondly, each user
has a separate ask price that takes values in [0, K]. Thus, each user maintains and updates a
separate ask price distribution that is apriori uniform over [0, K]. Thirdly, in each round, the
ith user sends the K-bit vector xit , whose components are calculated using the corresponding
marginal bid and the corresponding posterior median. More explicitly, the k th component of xit
is
Ikth marginal bid of user i > Posterior median of kth marginal bid of user i .
These K bits are used to update the K marginal bid posteriors of user i. Fourthly, the CA sends
2K + 1 feedback bits to each user. The first K of these bits are equal to yit , whose components
are the K received bits so that the users can perform the same updates as the CA. The next K
bits are denoted using uit . The k th component of uit denotes whether the ith user won the k th
unit of spectrum or not. The updated bid price estimates are used to decide the winners and the
ask price for that spectrum use period, as per the rules of Vickrey auction outlined earlier. The
last bit of feedback (ỹit ) is used to convey the updated ask distribution to the user:
ỹit = IUser i’s ask price in round t > Median of user i’s ask distribution in round t

(7)

While updating the ask price posterior, this bit is again treated by the user and by the CA as
if it has been received from a virtual user through a BSCp . Apart from these four changes,
the update procedure and update equations are identical to the truthful single-unit auctions. In
the simulations of quantized Vickrey auctions in Section IX-B, the revenue of the CA and the

payoffs of the users tend to the true theoretical revenue and the true payoff. This suggests that
asymptotically, it is weakly dominant for each user to truthfully reveal its value profile.
VIII.

M ATCHED

AUCTIONING WITH TIME - VARYING BIDS

In this section, we return to the matched auctioning algorithm with non-strategic users, and
extend it for time-varying bids. When the bids are allowed to vary with time, it is possible under
matched auctioning that the CA becomes overconfident about its estimates of the bid prices.
By this we mean that when a user’s bid changes after remaining constant for many update-andallocate rounds, the posterior distribution of the bid would be very close to the unit step at the
previous price. Consequently, the corrections sent by the user would not affect the CA’s estimate
of the price significantly. This would result in the matched auctioning algorithm tracking bid
prices very slowly, or completely failing to track them. Therefore, the CA’s revenue could be
substantially lower than the highest bid. In this section, the system set-up and the auction scheme
are the same as in matched auctioning. Two major differences are a model for time-varying bids
which we call as the bid-drift model, and a significant modification to the posterior update step
in Section V-B. The modification to the posterior update step enables effective tracking of timevarying bids, and gives revenues that are close to the revenue with perfect knowledge of the
bids.
A. Bid-drift model
For each user i, bids are represented as independent discrete-time random processes Bi (t),
and an additive model is used to represent their dynamics:
Bi (t + 1) =



min{max{Bi (t) + Ni (t + 1), 0}, 1} w. p. q

Bi (t)

(8)

w. p. 1 − q

In (8), Bi (1) is uniformly distributed in [0, 1], Ni (t + 1) is independently uniform over a small
interval [−ǫ, ǫ] and q is the probability that the bid price changes in the next round. So for any
update round t and user i, P{ith bid changes at t + 1} = q, and q is assumed to be constant and
identical for all the users.

Fig. 7.

Shape of F (b; b0 , λ, µ) for three possible locations of b0 .

B. Posterior update algorithm for time-varying bids
After each posterior distribution update, if the posterior distribution of any bid price is
sufficiently close to the unit step function at the respective posterior median, then the CA approximates the distribution as another distribution that is more spread-out than the unit step function.
Therefore, our main idea to enable the CA to track moving bids is to perform posterior updates
while not allowing the individual posterior distributions to collapse into the unit step function.
The distribution that we use for approximation must be such that most of the corresponding
density is concentrated about the posterior median, but at the same time, all values in [0, 1] have
non-zero density. Although the approximation comes at the cost of the CA not knowing exactly
what the bid price is, we show by simulation that this is effective in achieving revenues that are
close to the maximum bid and outperforms matched auctioning when the bids are time-varying.
As an approximation of the unit step at b0 ∈ [0, 1], we take a cumulative distribution function
F (b; b0 , λ, µ) with median b0 . The corresponding probability density is denoted f (b; b0 , λ, µ).
The shape parameters 0 < λ ≪ 1 and 0 < µ ≪ 1 control how close F is to the unit step
at b0 . We use a piecewise linear F , illustrated in Fig. 7 for a few parameter values. The exact
equations for the three cases depicted in Fig. 7 are shown in (9), (10) and (11).
Case 1: If b0 −

µ
2

> 0 and b0 + µ2 < 1, then F (b; b0 , µ, λ) =


λ

if b ∈ (0, b0 − µ2 ]
µ b


 (b0 − 2 )
+λ
if b ∈ (b0 − µ2 , b0 + µ2 ]
(b − b0 + µ2 ) 1−2λ
µ




 λ µ (b − b − µ ) + 1 − λ if b ∈ (b + µ , 1).
0
0
1−b0 −
2
2
2

(9)

Case 2: If b0 −

µ
2

< 0, then F (b; b0 , µ, λ) =


b

if b ∈ (0, b0 ]

2b0


+ 12
if b ∈ (b0 , b0 + µ2 ]
(b − b0 ) 1−2λ
µ




 λ µ (b − b − µ ) + 1 − λ if b ∈ (b + µ , 1).
0
0
1−b0 −
2
2

(10)

2

Case 3: If b0 +

µ
2

> 1, then F (b; b0 , µ, λ) =


λ

b
if b ∈ (0, b0 − µ2 ]

b0 − µ

2

+ λ if b ∈ (b0 − µ2 , b0 ]
(b − b0 + µ2 ) 1−2λ
µ




 b−b0 + 1
if b ∈ (b0 , 1).
2(1−b0 )
2

(11)

We assume that at the end of round t, the posterior density of Bi is fit , with median mi .
For a threshold θ > 0, if D(fit (b)||f (b; mi , λ, µ)) < θ, then we approximate the posterior
distribution using F (b; mi , λ, µ). As a measure of divergence (D) we use the Bhattacharyya
distance [28]. If f1 and f2 are probability density functions of continuous random variables,
then the Bhattacharyya distance between them is given by

Z
p
f1 (b)f2 (b)db
D(f1 ||f2 ) = − log
The Bhattacharyya distance between two discrete probability mass functions p1 and p2 is obtained
from this equation by replacing f1 with p1 , f2 with p2 , and the integral with summation.
If we use

UPDATE T RACK

for posterior updates, it is possible for the posterior median to be

substantially larger than the bid price even after many update-and-allocate rounds have been
completed. This means that if we set the ask price very close to the posterior median of the
winner, then the winner could reject spectrum even after many rounds. Therefore, the CA sets
the ask price to be equal to maxi {Mi,t+1 } − µ, where µ is the same as shown in Fig. 7. In

the following round, the ith user replies back to the CA, knowing that the CA’s estimate of the
posterior median and consequently the ask price, is based on this modified procedure. Therefore,
the ability to track moving bid prices comes at the cost of setting the ask price to a value that
is lower than in the case of constant bid prices. But in the next section, we see that despite this,
the revenue of the CA is still very close to the ideal case of perfect tracking. Therefore, to adjust
for tracking, we simply replace

UPDATE D ISTRIBUTION

in Figs. 4 and 5 with

UPDATE T RACK

function Fit ←UPDATE T RACK(Fi,t−1 , yit )
Fit ← UPDATE D ISTRIBUTION (Fi,t−1 , yit )
mi,t+1 ← Median(Fit )
fit ← density correspondingto Fit
if D fit (·)||f (·|mi,t+1 , λ, µ) < θ then
Fit (·) ← F (· ; mi,t+1 , λ, µ)
end if
end function

Fig. 8.

Posterior updates adjusted for bid-drift.

shown in Fig. 8 and use µ in place of h while setting the ask price.
IX.

S IMULATION

SET- UP AND RESULTS

In Section V-B, we have derived recurrence relations for updating the posterior distribution
of bid prices. But deriving these updates in closed form is difficult even for simple prior
distributions. In order to circumvent this problem and to account for prices being discrete, we
discretize the [0, 1] interval such that bid prices are integer multiples of ∆.
A. Convergence of matched auctioning
The left panel of Fig. 9 shows the convergence of the revenue to B(N ) −h, with ∆ = 10−5 and

h = 10−3 . Here again, B(N ) is used to denote the maximum of the N bids. We show for a few
values of δ that P{|Revenue at time t − B(N ) + h| < δ} gets close to 1, where probabilities are
estimated as empirical probabilities over R = 1000 independent joint realizations of bid prices
and channel outputs. As opposed to this behavior, we see that the mean revenue for our first
scheme of unmatched auctioning explained in Section IV is significantly smaller than the mean
maximum bid. This is shown in the right panel of Fig. 9 along with standard error bars. The
√
length of the error bars in each round is equal to 2σ̂/ R, where σ̂ is the estimated standard
deviation of the revenue in that particular round, and R = 104 is the number of Monte Carlo
rounds over which the averaging was performed.
B. Convergence of auctions with strategic users
From Sections VI and VII, we can see that truthful matched auctioning is exactly the same
as quantized Vickrey auctions for K = 1. We show by simulation the convergence properties of
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Fig. 9. Left Panel: Convergence of revenue for matched auctioning with N = 10. Right Panel: Average revenue of unmatched
auctioning with error bars for different values of N and p.

quantized Vickrey auctions for 10 users and K = 1 or K = 4 units. The left panel of Fig. 10
illustrates the convergence in probability of the CA’s revenue to the true theoretical revenue.
Unlike matched auctioning where all the probabilities start very close to zero, we sometimes
have non-zero probabilities starting at the very first round since in Vickrey auctions, we do
not allow winners to reject spectrum. We also show that the average user payoff converges
to the true theoretical average, where the averaging is done over users. This is depicted in
the center panel of Fig. 10. The right panel of the same figure shows the average payoff for
auctioning one spectrum unit. This is averaged over 10 strategic users and 1000 Monte Carlo
rounds and shown as a function of the number of update rounds. From this panel, we infer that
the expected payoff becomes positive right from round two. Therefore, even though our set up
differs significantly from classical auctions where bid revelation is error free, these simulations
suggest that individual rationality could be preserved after very few update rounds. This figure
suggests that asymptotically, quantized Vickrey auctions behave identically to Vickrey auctions.
Therefore, this suggests that it is weakly dominant for users to reveal their bids truthfully as the
number of auction rounds increases.
C. Comparison between matched auction and matched auction adjusted for bid-drift
When bids are allowed to vary with time according to the model of Section VIII-A, we
show that the tracking algorithm proposed in Section VIII-B performs better than our matched
auctioning algorithm with no tracking. We compare their efficiency ratio, which is the ratio of
the average revenue to the average maximum bid, averaged over the update-and-allocate rounds
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Fig. 10. Convergence of revenue and payoff to their true theoretical values in quantized Vickrey auctions for N = 10 users.
The right most panel shows the expected payoff averaged over 10 users for auctioning one spectrum unit.
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and then averaged over Monte Carlo rounds. If the CA is able to perfectly track the bids, then
we expect this ratio to be 1 for all values of q and ǫ, defined in Section VIII-A. But in reality, for
N = 5, we observe the behavior shown in Fig. 11. The left and right panels of this figure depict
the ratio as a function of q for ǫ = 0.01 and as a function of ǫ for q = 0.02, respectively. In
these experiments we use ∆ = 1/5000, h = 1/1000, and for the piecewise linear approximation
shown in Fig. 7, we take the parameters to be λ = 0.005 and µ = 0.005. We take the threshold
on the Bhattacharyya distance θ = 0.3. We see from the left panel of Fig. 11 that with tracking,
the ratio is very close to 1 till around q = 0.1. We also observe that the improvement achieved
by matched auctioning with tracking is most pronounced when q is between 10−2 and 10−1 . For
very small values of q, the bids do not drift too much and the two methods are equally good.
In contrast, for very large values of q, both methods are unable to track effectively. The right
panel of Fig. 11 also shows matched auctioning with tracking performing better than without
tracking for ǫ > 5 × 10−3.
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Fig. 12. (Avg. revenue)/(Avg. maximum bid) vs. λ (left panel), θ (middle panel) and µ (right panel) for N = 5 and p = 0.05.

D. Sensitivity of tracking algorithm to parameter settings
In this subsection, we examine the sensitivity of the efficiency ratio with respect to the tracking
parameters λ, θ and µ. For these simulations, we fix N = 5 and p = 0.05 and sweep over one
of the parameters while keeping the other two constant. For the case where we sweep λ over
the interval [0.001, 0.01], the results show very little sensitivity to the value of λ as seen in the
left panel of Fig. 12. Similarly, the plot in the middle panel of Fig. 12 does not show much
sensitivity to θ. In contrast to these results, while sweeping µ over [0.001, 0.01], we observe
that for small values of µ, the performance is significantly degraded as seen in the right panel
of Fig. 12. The reason for this is that low values of µ result in F being too close to the unit
step, which causes tracking to be very slow. Moreover, small values of µ would result in more
rejections by the winner if the bid price happens to decrease.
E. Comparison of overheads in open-loop and closed-loop schemes
The bits used for bid revelation go through a noisy channel. Hence they must be encoded
to correct errors. Without encoded bits, the scheme would correspond to unmatched auctioning
which is highly inefficient as seen in Section IX-A. The encoding can either use channel output
feedback, like we have done in our scheme, or ignore feedback and use an open-loop scheme. We
argue here that if a state-of-the-art open-loop scheme is used, then the number of bits required
for reliable bid revelation is much higher than for our proposed scheme. For simplicity, we
consider the case of a single unit auction and a single user revealing its bid to the CA. Openloop schemes in the form of block codes encode a message that is k bits long into a codeword
of n > k bits. The receiver uses a noisy received codeword to determine which one of the 2k

equally likely messages was sent. The message point perspective cannot be directly compared
with the block coding perspective since the message point is a continuous random variable,
whereas the message in block coding is discrete. Nevertheless, we endeavor to develop a fair
comparison by mapping the message point perspective to the block coding perspective here.
For simulating posterior matching, we divide the [0, 1] interval into K equally spaced intervals.
Now the message point is a discrete random variable whose observed value can be one of K
equally likely messages. If we use n transmissions, then we define the rate of the code to be
log2 (K)/n. Popular open-loop codes like LDPC codes use the definition of rate to be k/n,
where the message is k bits long and the codeword is n bits long. The code is evaluated using
the frame error rate (FER), which is the probability that a message would get decoded into an
incorrect message by the receiver. Similarly, in the message point perspective, we say that a
frame error occurs when |θ − θ̂| > 1/(2K), where the message point is θ and the estimate of the
message point after n transmissions is θ̂. Here θ̂ is the posterior median after n transmissions.
One problem with this comparison is due to the usage of a discrete posterior distribution,
whereas posterior matching needs a continuous posterior distribution for its convergence results. Therefore, our simulations–which are actually an approximation of the posterior matching
scheme–would give FERs that are an upper bound on the FERs with a continuous posterior
distribution. Table I shows a comparison of the closed-loop scheme with an LDPC code depicted
in Fig. 2 of [29]. In the table, the second column shows the error rates of the open-loop code
from [29] and the third column shows the error rate of the code used in our paper. The openloop code has parameters k = 35, n = 210 and a rate of 35/210. The rate is lower–and hence
more conservative–than the rate of our closed-loop code, which has rate log2 (K)/n = 0.332, for
K = 100000 and n = 50. From the table, we infer that the closed-loop scheme does better in
terms of FER even when we use a discrete approximation and for a much smaller block length.
Hence multi-bit versions of our scheme would outperform open loop schemes and would also
scale better for applications such as multi-unit auctions and time-varying bid prices.
X.

C ONCLUSION

We have presented a realistic micro-level view of auctions in secondary spectrum markets
by explicitly modeling the process by which bidders convey their bids to a clearing authority.
Specifically, we have modeled quantization and noise for the first time in this context. When bids

TABLE I.

p
0.05
0.06
0.1

C OMPARISON OF O PEN -L OOP AND C LOSED -L OOP S CHEMES

FER open-loop (code 2 from [29])
> 10−1
> 10−1
> 10−1

FER closed-loop (from our simulations)
0.018
0.031
0.049

are constant, we have proved that our scheme is optimal in the sense of asymptotically getting
arbitrarily close to the CA’s optimal revenue. We have also extended the scheme to accommodate
strategic bidders, to simultaneously auction multiple spectrum units among strategic bidders and
to track slowly varying bid prices. Our simulations illustrate the theoretical results that we proved
in Section V-C, and suggest the optimality of the schemes for strategic bidders. They further
show the effectiveness of our tracking procedure and its robustness to different parameters of
the drift model. Our extensions illustrate the importance of low rate feedback since our schemes
scale well in both situations, whereas open-loop schemes would have prohibitive overheads.
XI.

A PPENDIX

A. Update equations for matched auctioning
We first observe that the proposition can be rewritten in terms of four cases instead of two.
This is done by dividing each of the two cases into two other cases for yit = 1 and yit = 0. The
equations for the four cases needed to calculate Fit from Fi,t−1 and the bit yit received from
user i in round t, are as follows.
Case 1: b < mit and yit = 1
Fit (b) =

pFi,t−1 (b)
.
1 − p − (1 − 2p)Fi,t−1 (m′it )

(12)

(1 − p)Fi,t−1 (b)
.
p + (1 − 2p)Fi,t−1 (m′it )

(13)

Case 2: b < mit and yit = 0
Fit (b) =

Case 3: b ≥ mit and yit = 1
Fit (b) =

(1 − p)Fi,t−1 (b) + (2p − 1)Fi,t−1 (m′it )
.
1 − p + (2p − 1)Fi,t−1 (m′it )

(14)

pFi,t−1 (b) + (1 − 2p)Fi,t−1 (m′it )
.
p + (1 − 2p)Fi,t−1 (m′it )

(15)

Case 4: b ≥ mit and yit = 0
Fit (b) =

We assume that the discretization interval for the bid prices is ∆. In the continuous case, ∆ = 0.
In the discrete case, ∆ > 0, and the bid prices are integer multiples of ∆ with probability 1.
We fix a user i and derive the procedure for computing the posterior distribution Fi,t from
Fi,t−1 and yi,t . To make the notation lighter, we drop the index i and denote the posteriors by
Ft and Ft−1 , respectively, and the bit received by the CA from the i-th user in round t by yt .
We denote by mt the specific realization of the median of Ft−1 , computed by the CA. We let
m′t = mt − ∆.
To relate Ft to Ft−1 and yt , we use the Bayes rule and the total probability theorem:
Ft (b) =P{B ≤ b|Yt }
=P{B ≤ b|yt , Yt−1 }

P{yt |B ≤ b, Yt−1 }P{B ≤ b|Yt−1 }
P{yt |Yt−1 }
P{yt |B ≤ b, Yt−1 }Ft−1 (b)
=
P{yt|Yt−1 }
=

t |B≤b,Yt−1 }Ft−1 (b)
.
= P{yt |B≤b,Yt−1P{y
}Ft−1 (b)+P{yt |B>b,Yt−1 }[1−Ft−1 (b)]

(16)

We now evaluate the two terms that occur in the denominator of (16). We consider two cases
separately: b < mt and b ≥ mt .
Case 1: b < mt .
In this case, event B ≤ b implies that the bid price B is below the median mt , and therefore
xt = 0. Hence, the first term in the numerator of (16) can actually be rewritten as follows:
P{yt|B ≤ b, Yt−1 } = P{yt|xt = 0, B ≤ b, Yt−1 }.

(17)

Recall that we assume the channel noise to be both temporally independent and independent of
the users’ messages. Therefore, given xt = 0, the received bit yt is conditionally independent
of both the bid price B and all the past received messages Yt−1 . This means that (17) can be
rewritten as P{yt|xt = 0}. This is equal to the probability of error in BSCp if yt = 1 and to the
probability of correct reception if yt = 0. We denote this quantity by rt :
P{yt|B ≤ b, Yt−1 } = pyt + (1 − p)(1 − yt ) ≡ rt .

(18)

The second term in the denominator of (16) is
P{yt |B > b, Yt−1 }P{B > b|Yt−1 } = P{yt, B > b|Yt−1 }
= P{yt, b < B < mt |Yt−1 } + P{yt, B ≥ mt |Yt−1 }
= P{yt|b < B < mt , Yt−1 }P{b < B < mt |Yt−1 }
+ P{yt |B ≥ mt , Yt−1 }P{B ≥ mt |Yt−1 }
= rt [Ft−1 (m′t ) − Ft−1 (b)] + (1 − rt ) [1 − Ft−1 (m′t )]
= −rt Ft−1 (b) + (2rt − 1)Ft−1 (m′t ) + 1 − rt .

(19)

We now substitute (18) and (19) back into (16) to obtain the update formula for the case b < mt
rt Ft−1 (b)
1 − rt + (2rt − 1)Ft−1 (m′t )

(1 − p)Ft−1 (b)


if yt = 0,

p + (1 − 2p)Ft−1 (m′t )
=
pFt−1 (b)


if yt = 1.

1 − p + (2p − 1)Ft−1 (m′t )

Ft (b) =

(20)

Case 2: b ≥ mt .
We proceed similarly to evaluate the two terms in the denominator of (16). We start with the
second term:
P{yt |B > b, Yt−1 } =P{yt|xt = 1}
=(1 − p)yt + p(1 − yt )
=1 − rt .

(21)

For the first term, we have:
P{yt|B ≤ b, Yt−1 }Ft−1 (b) = P{yt , B ≤ b|Yt−1 }
= P{yt , mt ≤ B ≤ b|Yt−1 } + P{yt, B < mt |Yt−1 }
= P{yt |mt ≤ B ≤ b, Yt−1 }P{mt ≤ B ≤ b|Yt−1 }
+ P{yt |B < mt , Yt−1 }P{B < mt |Yt−1 }
= (1 − rt ) [Ft−1 (b) − Ft−1 (m′t )] + rt Ft−1 (m′t )
= (1 − rt )Ft−1 (b) + (2rt − 1)Ft−1 (m′t ).

(22)

Substituting (21) and (22) into (16), we obtain the update formula for the case b ≥ mt :
(1−r )F

(b)+(2r −1)F

(m′ )

t
t
t−1
t−1
t
Ft (b) = (1−rt )Ft−1 (b)+(2r
′
t −1)Ft−1 (m )+(1−rt )(1−Ft−1 (b))
t

(1 − rt )Ft−1 (b) + (2rt − 1)Ft−1 (m′t )
=
1 − rt + (2rt − 1)Ft−1 (m′t )

pFt−1 (b) + (1 − 2p)Ft−1 (m′t )


if yt = 0,

p + (1 − 2p)Ft−1 (m′t )
=
(1 − p)Ft−1 (b) + (2p − 1)Ft−1 (m′t )


if yt = 1.

1 − p + (2p − 1)Ft−1 (m′t )

(23)
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